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In Re Dish Network Derivation Litig., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (Sept. 14, 2017)1 
 
CIVIL APPEAL: BUSINESS LAW 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that the Auerbach test should be applied when a Special Litigation 
Committee (SLC) files a motion to defer a derivative claim. A derivative claim is dismissible if 
the SLC was independent and conducted a good faith investigation when it concluded litigation 
would not be in the company’s best interest.  
 
Background 
From April 2012 to April 2013, Charles W. Ergen, Dish Network Corporation’s CEO, 
purchased $690 million in LightSquared’s secured debts with personal assets through an entity he 
owned called SP Special Opportunities (SPSO). Ergen informed Dish that it could obtain 
LightSquared assets through its bankruptcy.  Ergen also disclosed to Dish’s board that he bought 
LightSquared debt. Dish submitted a plan to acquire LightSquared, but Dish’s Board terminated 
the bid.  
Jacksonville, one of Dish’s stockholders, brought a claim against Ergen for unjust 
enrichment, and against Ergen and Dish’s board and officers for breach of loyalty. Jacksonville’s 
claims arose from Ergen’s purchase of LightSquared’s debt under SPSO’s entity; the Special 
Transaction Committee that Dish’s board established to consider purchasing LightSquared; and 
Dish’s bid for LightSquared secured debts.  Dish’s board created a Special Litigation Committee 
(SLC) to determine if it should pursue Jacksonville’s claims.. The SLC’s members were Tom A. 
Ortolf and George R Brokaw, two longstanding board members and close friends to Ergen. 
Jacksonville filed a complaint with the court because of Ergen’s close ties to Ortolf and Brokaw. 
The board added Charles M. Lillis to the SLC and approved a resolution that only allowed the SLC 
to act if Lillis approved the action.  
Jacksonville filed a second complaint that added the SLC members after Dish terminated 
its bid for LightSquared’s assets. The SLC determined pursuing litigation would not serve Dish’s 
best interests. The SLC moved the court to defer to its decision to avoid litigation and dismiss 
Jacksonville’s claims against Dish. The district court granted Jacksonville discovery after an initial 
hearing and briefing on the motion to defer. The district court granted SLC’s motion to defer after 
supplemental briefing and oral arguments. Then, Jacksonville appealed.  
The SLC filed its memorandum of costs, and Jacksonville filed a motion to retax. 
Jacksonville challenged SLC’s costs for electronic discovery, photocopying and scanning, and  
teleconferences. Pursuant to NRS 18.005(17), the district court awarded the SLC $151,178.32 for 
costs because the costs were reasonable expenses regarding the discovery requests the court 
granted Jacksonville. Pursuant to NRS 18.005(12), the district court awarded the SLC costs for 
photocopying. Pursuant to NRS 18.005(13) the district court also awarded SLC costs for 
teleconference calls. Jacksonville timely appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court consolidated 
the two appeals. 
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Discussion 
 
Jacksonville mainly took issue with the district court’s granting deference to the SLC’s 
decision to dismiss Jacksonville’s derivative complaint. The Nevada Supreme Court used the 
Auerbach test to determine if a district court can grant an SLC’s motion to defer to its decision. 
The Auerbach test determines whether an SLC is independent, and if its investigation was 
conducted in a good faith. The Nevada Supreme Court chose the Auerbach test over the more 
intrusive Zapata test because “Nevada’s business judgment rule ‘prevents courts from 
substitute[ing] [their] own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.’”2 
Under Auerbach, the district court should defer to the SLC’s judgment when its members 
are independent, and if the SLC conducted a good faith investigation of the derivative claim.3 The 
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court can decide how it applies the standard, 
and its ruling should not be remanded on appeal unless it abused its discretion. 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in deferring to the SLC’s decision and dismissing 
the complaint 
 
If a district court finds that an SLC was not independent or did not conduct a good faith 
investigation, the Auerbach standard instructs that a shareholder can proceed with a derivative 
claim after the SLC’s motion to defer. Here, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it granted the SLC’s motion to defer and dismissed the complaint 
because (1) the SLC’s voting structure required an independent member’s affirmative vote to effect 
any decision which illustrated the SLC’s independence, and (2) the SLC conducted a good faith 
investigation.  
 
Independence 
Jacksonville argued that the district court erred when it used a pre-suit demand futility case 
test that presumed the SLC’s independence and good faith, and placed the burden of proof to 
overcome that presumption on Jacksonville. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the test’s 
independence standard was also applicable to determine an SLC’s independence. In the demand-
futility context, the test requires courts to consider whether the board can exercise independent 
business judgment without being improperly influenced.4 Similarly, when evaluating an SLC’s 
business judgment, courts must consider whether improper influence impacted its decision not to 
pursue litigation. Conversely, the court may not presume independence or place the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff. 
When evaluating independence, courts may consider a variety of factors. For instance, 
when the board has a potentially liable director may be unable to consider the problem at issue on 
its merits. Courts also consider if a majority of the board members were materially benefited or set 
back by the board’s decision, but that the corporation and stockholders were not. Also, courts note 
that familial ties could show interestedness.  
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
used demand-futility context case law to show that the SLC was independent. The district court 
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did not apply a presumption in favor of the SLC, but “reached a conclusion irrespective of which 
party bears the burden.”  
Jacksonville argued that the district court erroneously concluded that the SLC was 
independent because two out of three members were not independent. The Nevada Supreme Court 
disagreed because Lillis was independent, and the SLC’s voting structure was dependent upon 
Lillis’ affirmative vote.   
 
Good-faith and through investigation 
 
 Jacksonville argued that the district court erred when it determined the SLC conducted a 
good-faith, thorough investigation.  The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed because there was no 
proof that the SLC investigated the claims in a “restricted scope” or executed a shallow 
investigation, in a half-hearted, shameful way inconsistent with business judgment doctrine. In 
fact, the SLC’s investigation included monitoring LightSquared’s bankruptcy; conducting 
interviews of sixteen people in twenty-one total interviews; reviewing documents which numbered 
hundreds of thousands of pages; and formally meeting seventeen times with additional informal 
and telephonic meetings.  
 
The district court was within its discretion to award costs for electronic discovery and 
photocopying and scanning, but abused its discretion in awarding costs for teleconferences 
 
Electronic discovery costs 
 
Jacksonville argued that the district court mistakenly awarded the SLC costs for electronic 
discovery because under NRS 18.005, electronic discovery expenses are not costs.5 The Nevada 
Supreme Court disagreed. The costs were “reasonable and necessary expense[s] incurred in 
connection with the action” because the Court required the SLC to produce the documents when 
it granted discovery to Jacksonville. 6 The SLC’s electronic discovery expenses did not include 
any legal fee costs.  
 
Costs for photocopying, scanning, and teleconferences 
Jacksonville also argued that the district court mistakenly awarded the SLC with costs for  
photocopying and scanning under NRS 18.005(12), and claims that the SLC did not submit 
justifying documents to prove the photocopying and scanning were necessary. The Nevada 
Supreme Court disagreed because the SLC provided the district court with documents, including 
an itemized list of charges and a declaration of counsel that explained how the expenses were 
incurred, supporting the awards for photocopying and scanning costs.  
 Finally, Jacksonville argued that the district court mistakenly awarded SLC with costs for 
teleconferences under NRS 18.005(13) because the SLC did not provide proper documents that 
justify the costs.  The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the district court abused its discretion when 
it awarded costs for teleconferences because the documents that the SLC provided did not show 
how the fees were incurred, or if they were appropriate for discovery.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant to the SLC’s motion to defer, 
awarded costs for electronic discovery, photocopying, and scanning, and vacated the district 
court’s awarded costs to the SLC for teleconferences because the SLC did not provide justifying 
information. 
 
Pickering, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
Justice Pickering agreed with the majority that Auerbach is the better approach for Nevada, 
but did not agree with the majority’s version of Auerbach because it was too deferential.  Justice 
Pickering specifically dissented about the genuine issues of material fact present regarding the 
SLC’s independence.  Justice Pickering reasoned that before the board added Lillis to the SLC, 
Ortolf and Brokaw made the SLC’s decisions regarding Jacksonville’s derivative complaint.  
Pickering argues further that the SLC’s independence should not merely hang on one member, in 
this case Lillis, but Ortolf’s and Brokaw’s disinterest and independence, too. As such, Pickering 
reasoned that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the SLC’s independence and 
disinterestedness.  Therefore, Pickering did not agree with the majority when it granted the SLC’s 
motion to defer a derivative complaint, and did not agree that the SLC’s recommendation to 
dismiss was based only on Dish’s best interests.  
 
